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Abstract:
This paper primarily addresses the reasoning behind the 2016 cyber-attack orchestrated
by the Russian Government against the United States. The primary question behind this paper is
why did hackers operating on behalf of the Russian government decide to commit to an
espionage-style attack to steal emails and documents during the 2016 election? This is important
due to the danger that these cyber-attacks pose to the United States already tense political
environment and integrity of the country’s election systems as well as the democracy of other
states. There is a real danger of the country’s democratic functions being impeded due to the
presence of foreign vested interests in the outcome of our elections. Major research has shown
that there are marked deficiencies within the United States cyber defense infrastructure and a
significant vested interest by the Russian government in seeing this attack carried out. This paper
argues that the failure of the federal and state governments to improve and centralize their cyber
security defenses is a major part of the reasoning behind why Russia conducted the attacks.

Page 3
I.

Intro
Cyber security has become a hot topic in international relations discourse as of late due to

its increasing relevance in the field of statecraft and international espionage. It has resulted in a
growing focus on how near instant communications across international borders has changed the
dimensions of sovereignty and statehood. This has led to some states, like Estonia, to focus
heavily on ensuring the safety and security of their citizens data due to the relatively small size
of their populations (The Consequences of Cyber Attacks 2016, 176). This kind of awareness and
protection has not been universal between all North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and
we have seen significant attacks against many member nations.
In 2016, the United States was subject to one of the worst cyber-attacks in its history
during a particularly contentious and fraught election that saw Donald Trump win the race. After
the election, it emerged that the cyber-attacks had originated from agents working directly for the
Russian government who had deliberately ordered the attack. This attack consisted of a breach of
the Democratic Party National Committee (DNC) database and saw thousands of damaging
emails released onto the website Wikileaks (Olhin 2017, 1579). This attack had a tremendous
effect on the rest of the election calling into account the legitimacy of the Democratic party and
giving the Republican party ammunition against the Hilary Clinton campaign. Given the already
fraught relationship between the United States and Russia, which had recently come to blows
over the Syria situation, why did the Russian government conduct such a massive and effective
cyberattack on the Democratic party? Determining why the Russian government acted in this
way is an important issue as The 2020 elections have been thrown into a state of chaos due to the
current public health crisis. This attack is something that scholars have been actively studying as
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the integrity of future elections in the United States depend adequate cybersecurity. In order
determine the cause for the hacking of the DNC database in 2016, we must answer several
questions about why the Russian government and its agents thought they could do it and what
motivated this attack. This paper will seek to answer what the background to the event was, what
have others said about this event, and if can compare this to another event in order to determine
what was the reasoning behind the event was.
Given the evidence and the slow response of the United States to respond to the breach in
the DNC database, it is likely that the Russian government chose to attack the United States in
this manner because they knew that the United States’s Cybersecurity infrastructure would not be
able to defend against it. To prove this, we will conduct a qualitative analysis between how the
UK and The United States handled cyberattacks and what were the distinguishing variables that
lead to the DNC being chosen as a target.
II. Structure and definition of terms
This will be a qualitative analysis that presents a two-fold argument behind why Russia
conducted the 2016 cyber attack on the United States election. This will be determined via
analysis of two variables. These variables will be analyzed within the context of two comparative
cases. One of these cases will be the 2016 attack on the US Democratic party database and the
other will be the similar hack of the 2016 United Kingdom European referendum by suspected
Russian operatives. These were chosen due to proximity in time, the similarity in kind of attack,
and the involvement of operatives of the Russian Federation’s government.
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In order to best give background behind the content of the attack, it is important to give
some background terms for clarification and identification purposes.
• Sovereignty-Concept derived from the treaty of Westphalia. It is a principle that depends on
the domain and the practical needs of each state but primarily deals with the ability to retain
political power and control over a set territory. The Tallinn Manual states that it applies to
cyberspaces (Jensen 2017, 740).
• Cyber Espionage-Defined as any act undertaken clandestinely or under false pretenses that
uses cyber capabilities to gather, or attempt to gather, information (Jensen 2017, 756).
• Cyberattacks-Online activities done by a group or individual that involve the stealing of corporate secrets, the spreading of false information, or the breach of government computers in an
attempt to steal state secrets
• Database-A structured set of data held in a computer, especially one that is accessible in
various ways.
• The Democratic National Committee-This is the entity that acts as the governing body for the
United States Democratic Party. They coordinate strategies and supplies to support candidates
throughout the country for local, state, and national office. It organizes the national Convention
held every four years before the presidential election to nominate and confirm a candidate for
President of the United States via delegates.
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) Attack-This is a malicious attempt to disrupt normal
traffic of a targeted server, service or network by overwhelming the target or its surrounding
infrastructure with a flood of Internet traffic.
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• Wikileaks-This website was created in 2006 by Julian Assange as a non-profit organization for
releasing documents obtained from anonymous sources (Zittrain and Sauter 2010).
• Internet Research Agency-A Russian company that works on behalf of Russian political and
economic interests to engage in online influence and cyber warfare in favor of Russian
interests.
This piece is primarily concerned with a comparative analysis of the 2016 DNC attack
and the attack that took place in Britain during the Brexit referendum to make the case for the
reasoning behind this attack. The paper will not discuss other foreign policy moves by the
Russian Federation except as context for previous foreign policy actions similar attacks to the
one that took place in 2016. It will also not cover similar attacks done by other entities except to
bring them up in the context of modern states having a history of this kind of activity.
III. Views on the attack
Amongst the literature on Russian foreign affairs, there have emerged several distinct
schools of thought to explain this particular event. While this attack is contemporary, the amount
of research that has already been accomplished has been quite substantial. Amongst the
discourse, some find an explanation of the issue via the filter of Realpolitik/realist views while
others point to the lack of concrete law in international cyberspace and the ineffectiveness of the
United States’s response before, during, and after the attack. While there are many schools of
thought, the two most relevant ones are the realist and liberal schools of thought as they provide
research and scholarship that takes into account both Russian History and United States policy
failures in a thorough and constitutive way.

Page 7
One of the many leading schools of thought surrounding this event would have to be the
school of conventional political realism. The school of realism has many offshoots but similar
roots in the work of Hobbes, Morganthau, and Mearshimer. Their assumptions are the primary
actors within international relations and that the international system is anarchic and unable to be
ruled. The realist school therefore explains this cyber-attack as retaliation against United States
actions prior to 2016 and is best introduced through the concept of “Vested Interest Theory”.
This theory, proposed by Johnathan J. Godinez presumes that in international relations, there are
certain countries which possess a degree of political, economic, and military that they might be
considered “predator-countries” which through means of espionage can conduct massive foreign
electoral intervention (Godinez 2018, 1). The United States and the Russian Federation have
been determined to possess this kind of power and are thus identified as “predator-countries”.
These kind of countries operate this way out of a belief that participating in foreign electoral
intervention that will provide them with the furthering of their own interests, betterment and well
being (Godinez 2018, 4). This implies the realist outlook of individual sovereign states operating
in a global anarchy with very little international oversight. With this being known, what are
Russia’s interests? Scholars have pinned down that “for Russian foreign policy, the key goals are,
first, to ensure the country’s high international status and to influence global affairs; and second,
to exclude external influences from what Russia defines as its privileged sphere of
interest” (Libman and Obyendenkova 2018, 1045). There are numerous examples of Russia
acting in this way in the recent past via means that even go past electoral interference in states
like Ukraine and Georgia (Sadłocha 2019, 254). Both are states with significant Russian
minorities and are in the process of being courted by the United States and the European Union
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for participation in their institutions (Sadłocha 2019, 242). It also should be understood that
Russia has conducted similar efforts to the US election cyber attack in the past with many attacks
taking place after the 2014 Ukrainian Conflict. These attacks have often originated from the
Internet Research Agency in Russia. This private organization works on behalf of the Russian
government and has conducted significant influence campaigns that seek to destabilize
democracies on a mass scale (Sinclair 2018, 118).They function as a mouthpiece for rhetoric on
Russian strength and Western weakness while also functioning as a spearhead and tool for
Russian government official in the cyber domain. This fits in well with the idea of contemporary
Russian realists who espouse rhetoric that fits in well with both Godinez’s assertions about
“Vested Interest theory” and how a state is perceived being crucial to the prestige of said state.
Another view in this school of realist thought comes from the perspective of sovereignty
and how it is used and viewed by the Russian government. It has been widely held in the
international community that interference with a foreign political process may be illegal and it is
primarily frowned upon when it occurs in the system of international relations. However there
are issues with how the legal argument for its illegality are constructed and how each of the
terms are used. Sovereignty can be defined as the political will of the people of a particular state,
but “the notion of sovereign will described above does not accord with the concept of
sovereignty as public international lawyers usually use the term” according to scholars of the
issue (Ohlin 2017, 1595). Lawyers and jurists use the term in the context of the rights of a state
to control its territory. This is where it is tricky to make the argument in the ways lawyers do
about this topic because what Russia attacked was not territory or interests, but instead a
technical apparatus of a political party. However, while this kind of attack does not play into
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conventional ideas of what sovereignty means to the United States government and law
professionals, the conducting of this attack was very much in tune with Russian behaviors
towards its sovereignty. For Russia, it tends to view its own sovereignty in a proactive way and
views threats from abroad as not simply territorial. They tend to view threats in the in terms of
economic, cultural, and social thus enabling broad strategies for foreign policy maneuvers
(Deyermond 2016, 965). To them “Russia was not causing any disturbance in the international
order, but merely protecting its national interests” and thus using more of the general term for
sovereignty (Sadłocha 2019, 240). All of this fits well within the school of neorealism in
particular with its focus on the international relations system and how different countries have
perceptions of national interests, how that is influenced by their political systems, and where a
state is located geopolitically.
However, one of the big driving factors behind the realist school is an emphasis on
practically and pragmatism that the modern Russian government seems to embrace. This is the
school of Realpolitik, and it can be seen as the grandfather to a plurality of realist political
dispositions in the world today. Realpolitik has its origins in the political career of Otto von
Bismarck who helped unify Germany as a contiguous sovereign state through strategies that
often allowed for violence and negative integration. Realpolitik has been a consistent feature
amongst Russian leadership since the days of the Russian Tzars and it continues to be seen in the
foreign policy moves that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chooses (Sadłocha 2019, 240). This is a
mindset of embracing practical yet sometimes contradictory solutions to political issues out of a
need for strength and prestige. According to several scholars “the elements of the Realpolitik
policy have become a constant element of the identity of Russian leaders and social expectations
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towards the greatness of the Russian country and its prestige in the world have shaped the current
identity of the Russian society” and thus enables them to act in ways that outsiders might view as
aggressive (Sadłocha 2019, 256). To citizens of the United States, an attack on the US
Democratic party database is criminal, but to the Russians it is a practical way to ensure their
foreign policy goals are met. However, in the realist school there is another branch that some
have ascribed to in order to better understand their actions.
The school of thought known as civilizational Realism argues that instead of being
anathema to existing international mechanisms, the Russian Federation’s government instead
wishes for a higher degree of international arbitration and conflict deterrent mechanisms with the
caveat that they favor Russian interests. Overall, through analysis of past interventions like in
Ukraine it has been determined “that Russia is not rejecting the traditional international
framework of conflict resolution. Rather, by making its counterarguments within the same
framework, it is reaffirming its importance”and necessity (Petro 2018, 324). They do not reject
international law and order as a concept but instead wish to combat the perceived hegemony of
the United States and European Union. Their version of multipolarity relies on a great degree of
negotiation which Moscow has become quite adept at in recent years (Karagorav 2012, 75). This
attitude is partially a rejection of the old Soviet view of international order under communist rule
and signifies more influence from the Realpolitik school than the school of radicalism in respect
to Russia’s foreign policy goals. This also fits well into previous conceptions of the Kremlin’s
approach to nationalism and national interest with many identifying the approach to be
inconsistent and more pragmatic towards international law (March 2012, 417). Russian foreign
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policy is not guided by one principle, but instead has many layers. With that being said, how
does one actually operationalize the reasoning on display here?
The independent variables that this school of thought seems to use are United States
elections on the national level and can be measured by the significance the election in question.
This argument is one of the stronger arguments available because we can actively measure a
correlation by looking at the presence of cyber attacks during important elections in western
democracies like the United States and others. However, there are flaws in regard to how this
school considers other elements such as international organizations like the UN, economic
interests, and the competing ideas presented by the United States and Russia respectively
The point that the school of Liberalism in international relations theory makes about this
attack points to the lack of concrete international law and retaliatory measures for cyber warfare
and terrorism.This school of thought believes that the current case of Russian cyber-warfares was
primarily due to the lack of coherent international laws surrounding cyber terrorism and
information warfare in general.
Those who follow this school are mostly those who ascribe to the theory of neoliberal
institutionalism and its notions of international relations. This discourse concerns how countries
looking for mutual benefit will be willing to make transnational agreements. While there may be
multinational organizations with a degree of regulation making and administrative power, there
are still some cracks which have not been filled. The often cited “Talinn Manual” only sets out
recommendations and guidelines for NATO, thus making it hard to pin down exactly what
constitutes and attack by a foreign power (Jensen 2017, 735). This is supported by scholars like
Logan Hamilton who believe that this attack is because “neither the UN charter nor customary
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international law can apply to such actions or provide a remedy to impacted states” amongst
other grievances with the current way the major powers deal with cyber espionage and attacks
(Hamilton 2017, 183). The current paradigm essentially allows for state actors to be treated the
same way as non-state actors and to get away with major violations of electoral law and privacy
law in the countries that are affected by attacks. This is due to the lack of overarching and shared
definitions as what qualifies as a cyber attack. Because there exists this discrepancy, when one
does occur there are some who do not consider it a true crime and thus the response is limited.
This is not helped by the idea that in cyber warfare, the idea of a neutral ground loses a lot of
veracity. This is brought up by scholars like Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey whom argue that in the zone of
cyber space, “Violations of the traditional principles of distinction and neutrality are more likely
to occur” in an online space (Kelsey 2008, 14-27). With a lack of a shared concept of neutrality
means that a belligerent state like Russia would never have to suffer any consequences for
attacks against non-military or non-hostile targets because there are no agreed terms of neutrality.
For this part of the school, the major issue is the lack of establishment of norms and what that
does to the world.
In contrast to the more internationally based neoliberal school, there is a more defense
oriented that one could identify as closer to traditional liberal assumptions about the way states
act. The main ideological backbone of this school is Immanuel Kant and other enlightenment
thinkers and does not assume that there are moral actors. This school firmly believes that the
cyber-attack was carried out with the expectation that the United States was not prepared for an
attack despite numerous attempts beforehand by other actors. Both China and North Korea have
attempted to gain access into files concerning government and civilian infrastructure which

Page 13
resulted in the infamous North Korean Hack of the Sony servers in 2014 (Lam 2018,
2172-2173). One would think that this would result in greater intensity of cyber defense, but
while there was some intensification of talks with China and reprisal attacks against North Korea
there was very little overarching structural change in how these things would be handled in the
future. Instead, the United States relied on the older ideas of International relations “specifically,
the U.S. response involved the doctrine of retorsions, economic sanctions law and practice, and
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations” used by many states around the world (Lam
2018, 2182). There are many who consider this framework to be not applicable anymore and that
current efforts are not enough to discourage future attack. This argument is made by the likes of
Dóra Dévai, who consider the current strategy to be outmoded by current frameworks used by
states like Russia. To him “the U.S. is lacking a working cybersecurity policy largely because its
perception of cyber threats is self-centered and still deeply rooted in the strategic thinking of
nuclear or traditional military attacks” and not in the realm of cyberspace (Dévai 2019, 59).The
problem specifically lies in how complex the situation is over this kind of technology and how
the security establishment of the United States has not adapted well to the new battlefield it finds
itself in.
However, others in the Liberal group say that say that the material threat is relatively
small in comparison to the other idea of threats posed by those looking to move towards war
measures. Experts like Troy Smith argue that blowing the kinds of attacks, like the 2016 hack,
out of proportion will end up backfiring when we really need to get serious about it. He argues
that “after people continue to hear ‘wolf’ cried for too long they might dismiss the threat of cyber
war and, unfortunately, the reality of the cyber threat along with it” when these attacks are used
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to drum up political hysteria (Smith 2013, 85). He is not arguing that the attack was not serious
but that the escalation of rhetoric could have us end up in a place where we cannot de-escalate
and our governments are therefore forced to make grave decisions. There have been similar calls
for measured approaches by others within the technology industry who are wary of government
intervention into their programs (Peck 2017, 8). It has also been argued that viewing Russia as an
adversary in the traditional sense is not helpful and may be guided by bias instead of rational
thought. Some scholars argue that the Russian government is less interested in a direct conflict
with the West is more concerned with prestige within its own neighborhood of Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (Gunitsky AND Tsygankov 2018, 387). Overall the argument this part of the
school presents is that while it is important to combat the threat, we must do it in a way that does
not risk greater conflict.
One could view the primary variable that this school uses to be the failure of the
International system to properly engage with cyber security affairs and it being primarily a case
of lack of shared definitions and minutia. This can be measured in the lack of enforced
international mechanisms to actively combat cyber attacks.
IV. Comparison and analysis
We will now apply these concepts to both how the effects of the lack proper cyber
defense and vested interest theory make the case for why Russia conducted these attacks. This
research design will be a qualitative analysis using congressional findings, academic journals,
and other sources to build a picture of how the variables of the “Vested Interests” and
cybersecurity failures had an impact on both cases. The cases selected will be the 2016 DNC
cyber attack and another hack that took place during Britain’s referendum to leave the European
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Union in 2016. This is a convenient case as both the vote and the election of Donald Trump were
both events that were widely covered by the media, both involved cyber espionage and
sometimes explicit cyber attacks, and both were influenced by parties outside of their respective
countries (Peck 2017, 8). The targeting of a database echoes greatly the attack on the DNC
database as well. There were many within the British government who were not plussed at the
idea of this happening to them but considering the evidence, it appears that it was so.
To start, a brief description of the details of both attacks. The Brexit referendum had seen
numerous irregularities as vested interests from both the European Union and others had been
established in the run up to the election including several members of the leave campaign
visiting several Russian sources (Cadwalladr and Jukes). The cyber-attack in question happened
during the 2016 Brexit referendum but was not detected until 2017. This attack concerned a
website used by UK citizens to register to vote and had crashed due to a suspected Distributed
Denial of Service (DDOS) attack from elsewhere (Reuters). This was initially suspected to be
due to millions of young voters looking to register last minute, but a government panel in the UK
had determined that the signs were more in line with a conventional cyber-attack. Although the
interference was not determined to have impacted the outcome, the attack was very troubling and
drew eyes on whether the UK could stand up to these kind of attacks that could happen in future
elections that could happen. It has been determined that the foreign elements who engaged the
attack were most likely from Russia and originated from the Internet Research Agency (US
Congress 2018, 39). Overall, the attack was much more of a minor affair as compared with the
one that took place in the US, but it provides a good comparison as another nation that subject to
a cyber attack by Russian government agents.
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The cyber-attack on the United States in 2016 has been quite well documented since the
event and with the actual event being conducted in the same year as the database DDOS attack in
Britain it provides a convenient comparison case. The environment of the 2016 United States
election has been well documented with both candidates emerging as some of the most
unpopular in history and with many decrying the democratic process. It was in this environment
that a breach occurred in the DNC database on June 14, 2016. It was not widely published or
known about at the time but the effects of it would be extremely noticeable with many decrying
the allegations that the DNC was favoriting certain candidates over others. On July 22, 2016, the
infamous website Wikileaks published nearly 20,000 emails and eight thousand different
attachments with more coming in waves up till the actual day of the election on November 7,
2016. Donald Trump won the election in what many saw as an upset. Soon after, it was
determined by the Central Intelligence Agency that the Russian government had participated
meaningfully in the attack on the DNC database with the intention of influencing the outcome
(Dévai 2019, 47). There were tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats, closure of diplomatic
compounds and eventually a new round of sanctions but more could not be enacted due to the
forthcoming change in power between the Obama and Trump administrations. It should be noted
that these intrusions were not into the voting process it self but instead were directed at the
apparatus of a major political organization that was fielding candidates for the election (Lam
2018, 2170). Despite the lack of actual vote manipulation, it was quite apparent in the aftermath
that the attack and subsequent leak had a substantial effect on the election as evidenced by the
many who point to it shifting the favor of the election to Donald Trump (Jameson 2018). Now

Page 17
that the details of each incursion have been established, we can now provide a comparison and
see which variable are significant.

Let us first view these attacks through the lens of what Russia’s vested interest might be
in both. The report on Russian hacking during the Brexit referendum, along with reporting
during the aftermath of the referendum, and since then can reveal some key clues, as well as
recognizing the UK’s place within world politics. While it is not the economic and military
powerhouse it once was, the United Kingdom still has a substantial part to place in the NATO
military alliance and as the location of London, one of the most economically significant cities in
the world. It is with this in mind that we can look at some of the connections which contribute to
a vested interest in Russia caring about the referendum. It has been established that there were
significant financial relationships between some of the most ardent pro-leave campaigners and
numerous Russian, both state and private, entities prior to the referendum thus opening levels of
communication between one side of the referendum and Russia (Cadwalladr and Jukes 2018).
These open lines of communication could allow for coordination with elements of the campaign
and with many meetings had between both the investors and the Russians we can assume this is
the case. This plays well into Russian strategies for causing disunity in Europe and eroding
commonly held truths throughout the amplification of existent social discord (US Congress
2018, 39). This has been identified as one of Russia’s main goals and is a vested interest as
Russia seeks to rearm and reaffirm their strength as a major social power with the added bonus of
having substantial financial ties with political and economic interests on one side of the
contentious political argument. It is here where one can see the vested interest as being tied to
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causing social discord in Britain because of its status as a NATO member and as an ally of the
US. Russia’s vested interest is to see the US and its allies not have influence and clout.
There are similar threads in the case behind the vested interest that Russia has in
influencing the results of the US election. The United States and Russia have been traditional
adversaries since the inception of the cold war and even in the post-soviet age there are still
tensions between the two countries which cannot be easily ignored. Recently that has manifested
in tensions over Russia’s intervention into Crimea and their support for separatists in Eastern
Ukraine (Tchandourize 2018, 17). This is compounded with US intervention in Syria on behalf
of the Anti-Assad Rebels, international condemnation of the treatment of LGBT individuals, and
the historic military rivalry that these nations have had in the race to acquire ballistic missiles
and nuclear arms.These reasons have resulted in a new round of tensions between the two and
more reason than ever to interfere in each-others businesses. Now the domain is in cyberspace
with the Russians looking to build up their intelligence and cyber security arsenal to counteract
any US efforts to do the same. It is in looking at the broader rivalry between the US and Russia
that we could maybe see the long game that the Russian government is playing here. According
to some researchers, the 2016 attack was not only an attempt to influence the outcome of the
election but also “it gave the Russian government access to data of American government
officials, and that data was then used during a wider information war” that Russia is currently
waging (Shuya 2018, 4). Ultimately, the vested interest is the desire to see the US and its allies
wane in terms of influence and status within the world. Therefore, using a cyber-attack to sway
American votes in a particular way is a valid tactic that they could use.

Page 19
When one looks at the cyber security failures of the UK, one can look at many different
avenues, but it is obvious that they possessed an overall better state of preparation and awareness
than the United States. The cyber attacks against Britain, specifically the one against the voter
database, attacked a broad range of British governmental interests including but not limited to
the media sector, the telecommunications sector, and the energy sector (US Congress 2018, 118).
The attacks were varied and included an online influence campaign directed by the Russian
Internet Research Agency but certain measures did help prevent even more major attacks. These
include measures to deter bad actors, prepare the online infrastructure for DDOS-style attacks,
and to determine appropriate response measures. These measures mentioned int the
congressional report allowed the UK to remain relatively unscathed from an espionage style
attack from Russian government like done to the US. However, because these attempts were only
enacted in 2016 and there is still little in the way to know the true extent of Russia’s attacks on
the UK population’s financial information, personal information, and other parameters (US
Congress 2018, 119). If the defenses could have been enacted sooner Russia might have not been
able to act in the way they want and could have even prevented the state from even the idea of a
DDOS style attack. Ultimately the failure, and thus the variable in question, is in the timing of
the institution of broader cyber security efforts and how they were not instituted in time to
prevent attacks like the DDOS on the voter database.
The US attack has been widely document and the Failures of the US cyber security have
been even more widely documented. However, the failures of the prior administrations can be
broken down into methodological, administrative, and timing failures. Prior to the attack, there
had been growing concerns within the intelligence branches of the United States going back to
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2011 and earlier citing the need for better cyber security against state and independent actors.
Following the recommendations back in 2011 where we can see one of the large issues that
seems to rear its head in the preparation of cyber defenses is the issue of how they are viewed.
For those operating in the defense sector, cyber security is often viewed in terms of quantity and
is viewed in the same way as conventional weapon systems like missile batteries or naval vessels
(Dévai 2019, 45). This mindset has its benefits, but it also places limitations kinds of strategies
that those in Washington endorse and who gets material support. This is where resource
management and distribution comes into the argument as the United States federal government
has a duty to distribute funding in many different directions and too many sources that are hard
to direct. These include state governments, the Federal Bureau of Intelligence, Homeland
Security, and numerous other agencies and governmental units which cannot act in unison the
same way that the UK or other governments can act (Dévai 2019, 49). This results in a certain
amount of fragmentation and lack of decisiveness. While there has been efforts to implement
more forward thinking policy in this field, it has often seen criticism for their lack of legality
(Cook 2018, 208). This in particular allowed for the attack to happen the way it did and even
after the attack there were still “naming and shaming” of New York for allowing it to happen due
to the DNC database being located there (Dévai 2019, 60) With this in mind, it appears that the
failures of the US cybersecurity apparatus can be mostly understood through the decentralization
of cyber security efforts and the dated viewpoint on cyber security by the United States
Department of Defense and others.
Now that it has been shown how each of these variables manifest in both cases, it is
important to compare and contrast. In terms of vested interest it appears that both attacks had

Page 21
relatively the same variable of a vested interest, in seeing the United States and its allies become
weaker and less capable against Russia and its foreign policy goals. The variable is the weakness
as represented by the public response to each event. Both the media in the UK and the United
States labeled these attacks as major failures and incredible missteps on the part of both
governments as shown by reporting from The Guardian and other news sources with the United
States being more widely discussed due to the public nature of the attack. These attacks have
called into question the reliability of both governments and have given rise to the idea that these
governments are less legitimate, and therefore weaker, because of them. The weakness, as
represented by the distrust in each government from the press and the public at large, can be
identified as the independent variable and as a commonality in both cases.
However, unlike the other variable, the failures of the cybersecurity apparatuses of both
states are on different scales and thus can lead to a greater possibility for the US attack to be
more easily seen as ebbing subject to both a vested interest by Russia and failure of cyber
defense. The UK attacks were not as destructive, though still dangerous, due to the UK’s
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to handle all cyber security matters creating a proverbial
one stop shop for cyber security needs within the country (US Congress 2018, 119). This
centralized process, along with a more visible response from the United Kingdom’s government,
created less damage and less of a negative response from the public and the press. This limited
the loss of prestige and potentially defused a toxic situation. Regardless of the outcome, the
Brexit debate was not swayed specifically by this attack and its fallout. This is something that
cannot be about the attack on the DNC database. Because of the diffuse, non-centralized, and
seemingly stale outlook of the Department of Defense on the implementation of cybersecurity
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measures, the Russian agents were able to retrieve countless documents and sensitive
information regarding the DNC and the candidates themselves. The revelation of the documents
publication in WikiLeaks created an image that the United States was weak on cybersecurity and
that the system was falling apart. The United States was not able to put up a truly effective cyber
security defense prior to the attack and therefore the attack ended up blossoming into something
dire. Many have analyzed how the attack helped sway members of the public to vote for Donald
Trump due to the bad image propagated by the leaked documents. Due to content of the leaked
documents, many became very unenthusiastic about a Hilary Clinton presidency and in time the
election proved this true as Donald Trump won the electoral college vote and became president
(Dévai 2019, 69). Overall, the failure of cyber security can be seen as a significant variable as it
was the main reasoning behind why the attacks took on different characteristics and were on
separate levels of effectiveness.
The conclusions that one can make from this comparison can be seen as follows. While
Russia’s vested interest was present in both cases and took on a similar character of an attempt to
weaken the United States and its allies, it was the failure of cybersecurity that can be seen as the
primary and most significant Independent variable. If the United States had centralized their
cyber security apparatus like the UK to better defend against cybersecurity attacks, Russia would
have most likely would have not seen the United States as being as much of a target and thus
would have not tried something as daring as the DNC attack. It is not that they did not possess
any defenses, but instead that the organization elements including the states, the FBI, the OMB,
and numerous other authorities, did not In this we find the independent variable as the
organizational, structural, and ideological issues that prevented a better cyber security defense
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apparatus from coming about prior to the US election. As this was the factor that determined the
severity of the attack and the aftermath, this is the significant aspect and the main factor into why
Russia believed it could impact the US election and weaken the US government in the eye of
both the public and the media.
V. Conclusion
Given the research that about Russian foreign policy, the United States’s cyber defense,
and its effects on 2016 election, there is a significant amount of evidence that the lack of
centralized and effect cyber-warfare defense policies is the reason for attack on the DNC
database. Through a comparative study showing the similarities between the situation in the UK
and the United States, it is clear that the most important aspect is the lack of an up-to-date and
solvent cyber security strategy that could prevent intrusions into databases like the kind at the
DNC. This variable is significant and shows that without proper mechanisms enacted by both
the United States and the international community, there will be further attacks from The Russian
Federation and other powers willing to exploit internal political tensions. If foreign powers were
able to get into a major political party’s database with that much ease, imagine what else they
could accomplish. The urgency of the issue should be understood as the political climate in the
United States right now points towards future polarization which could lead to more illicit
measures by other governments who have a vested interest in the outcome of future elections.
With an overall lessening of respect for sovereignty, peace, and self-determination of government
in general we could potentially see the concept of Westphalian sovereignty disappear and
something far more sinister take its place. The infrastructure of elections are incredibly reliant on
databases like the one that was attacked and the gathering of large quantities of personal data.
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The knowledge that this technology to safeguard people identities and documents can be
manipulated is concerning and should be acted upon. Without policies that can better protect
against cyber-attacks, we could potentially see harm come to both the United States and its
citizens. However this research is limited to the national scale and it would be prudent for
individual states to fund and consider their own studies to find out their own vulnerabilities.
Overall, if a broader cyber-security initiative is not presented by federal government before the
next major election, there are likely to be more attacks like this from an even greater number of
hostile actors from abroad.

Page 25

Bibliography

- Cadwalladr, Carole, and Peter Jukes. 2018. “Revealed: Leave.EU Campaign Met Russian
Officials as Many as 11 Times.” The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/
jul/08/revealed-leaveeu-campaign-met-russian-officials-as-many-as-11-times (July 8, 2018)

- Cook, Chris. 2018. “Cross-Border Data Access and Active Cyber Defense: Assessing
Legislative Options for a New International Cybersecurity Rulebook.” Stanford Law & Policy
Review 29 (Febuary): 205–36.

- “The Consequences of Cyber Attacks.” 2016. Journal of International Affairs 70 (1): 175–78.
- Dévai, Dóra. 2019. “The U.S. Response to the 2016 Russian Election Meddling and the
Evolving National Strategic Thought in Cyberspace: (Part 1).” AARMS: Academic & Applied
Research in Military & Public Management Science 18 (January): 59–77.

- Dévai, Dóra. 2019. “The U.S. Response to the 2016 Russian Election Meddling and the
Evolving National Strategic Thought in Cyberspace: (Part 2).” AARMS: Academic & Applied
Research in Military & Public Management Science 18 (January): 59–77.

- Deyermond, Ruth. 2016. “The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty-First Century Russian Foreign
Policy.” Europe-Asia Studies, no. 6 (July):957- 983.

- Godinez, Johnathan J. 2018.“The Vested Interest Theory : Novel Methodology Examining USForeign Electoral Intervention.” Journal of Strategic Security 11, no. 2 (2018): 1-34.

- Gunitsky, Seva, and Andrei P. Tsygankov. 2019. “The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian
Foreign Policy.” Problems of Post-Communism 65 (June): 385–93.

Page 26

- Hamilton, Logan. 2017. “Beyond Ballot-Stuffing: Current Gaps in International Law
Regarding Foreign State Hacking to Influence a Foreign Election.” Wisconsin International
Law Journal 35 No.1 (July): 182-204.

- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 2018. “How Russia Cyber Attacks Helped Trump to the US
Presidency | Kathleen Hall Jamieson.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/oct/22/russia-cyber-theft-trump-us-election-president-clinton.

- Jensen, Eric Talbot. 2017. “The Talinn Manual: Highlights and Insights.” Georgetown Journal
of International Law 48: 735–78.

- Karaganov, Sergei A., Kristina I. Cherniavskaia, and Dmitry P. Novikov. 2016. “Russian
Foreign Policy: Risky Successes.” Harvard International Review, no. 3 (March): 74-79.

- Kelsey, Jeffrey T.G. 2008. “Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of
Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare.” Michigan Law Review 106 (July):
14-27.

- Lam, Christina. 2018. “A Slap on the Wrist: Combatting Russia’s Cyber Attack on the 2016
U.S. Presidential Election.” Boston College Law Review 59 (June): 2166–2201.

- Libman, Alexander, and Anastassia V. Obydenkova. 2018. “Regional International
Organizations as a Strategy of Autocracy: The Eurasian Economic Union and Russian Foreign
Policy.” International Affairs 94 (May): 1037-1058.

- March, Luke. 2012. “Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications
of the New ‘Russian Idea.’” Europe-Asia Studies, no. 3 (May): 401-425.

- Ohlin, Jens David. 2017. “Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate
International Law?” Texas Law Review 95 (July): 1579–98.

Page 27

- Peck, Stuart. 2017. “Cybersecurity in World Politics.” ISSA Journal 15 (7): 8.
- Petro, Nicolai N. 2018. “How the West Lost Russia: Explaining the Conservative Turn in
Russian Foreign Policy.” Russian Politics 3 (3): 305–32.

- Reuters. 2017. “Brexit Referendum Website Might Have Been Hacked: UK Lawmakers.”
April 12, 2017.

- Sadłocha, Jarosław. 2019. “Heterogeneity of the Notion of Interest in Accordance with the
International Relations Theory: A Study of Russia’s National Interests.” International Studies:
Interdisciplinary Political & Cultural Journal 23 (1): 235-256.

- Sinclair, Michael R. 2018. “The Rising Dragon and the Dying Bear: Reflections on the
Absence of a Unified America from the World Stage and the Resurgence of State-Based
Threats to U.S. National Security.” Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 46
(1): 115–81.

- Shuya Mason. 2018. “Russian Cyber Aggression and the New Cold War.” Journal of Strategic
Security 11 (1): 1–18.

- Smith, Troy E. 2013. “Cyber Warfare : A Misrepresentation of the True Cyber Threat.”
American Intelligence Journal 31 (1): 82-85.

- Tchantouridze, Lasha. 2018. “The Black and the Caspian: Russia’s Warm Seas.” Central Asia
& the Caucasus 19 No.4 (2018): 16-24.

- US Congress. Senate. 2018. Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe:
implications for U.S. national security: a minority staff report prepared for the use of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress,

Page 28
2018 Sess., January 10. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf (April,
1,2020).

- Zittrain, Johnathan & Molly Sauter, Everything You Need to Know About Wikileaks, MIT
Tech Review(Dec. 9, 2010), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/421949/everything-youneed-to-know-about-wikileaks/ [http:// perma.cc/R2WH-9284].

